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Quantum key distribution based on orthogonal states allows secure quantum bit
commitment
Guang Ping He∗
School of Physics and Engineering, Sun Yat-sen University, Guangzhou 510275, China
For more than a decade, it was believed that unconditionally secure quantum bit commitment
(QBC) is impossible. But basing on a previously proposed quantum key distribution scheme using
orthogonal states, here we build a QBC protocol in which the density matrices of the quantum states
encoding the commitment do not satisfy a crucial condition on which the no-go proofs of QBC are
based. Thus the no-go proofs could be evaded. Our protocol is fault-tolerant and very feasible with
currently available technology. It reopens the venue for other “post-cold-war” multi-party crypto-
graphic protocols, e.g., quantum bit string commitment and quantum strong coin tossing with an
arbitrarily small bias. This result also has a strong influence on the Clifton-Bub-Halvorson theo-
rem which suggests that quantum theory could be characterized in terms of information-theoretic
constraints.
PACS numbers: 03.67.Dd, 03.67.Hk, 42.50.Ex, 03.65.Ta, 03.67.Ac, 03.65.Ud, 42.50.St
I. INTRODUCTION
Quantum bit commitment (QBC) is an essential prim-
itive for quantum cryptography. It is the building
block for quantum multi-party secure computations and
more complicated “post-cold-war era” multi-party cryp-
tographic protocols [1, 2]. The first QBC protocol was
proposed along with the very first proposal for quantum
key distribution (QKD), i.e., the Bennett-Brassard (BB)
84 protocol [3]. But it was pointed out at the same
time that the protocol is insecure against coherent at-
tacks. An improved one was proposed later, known as
the Brassard-Cre´peau-Jozsa-Langlois (BCJL) 93 proto-
col [4]. It was accepted as secure for a while until a
cheating strategy was found in 1996 [5]. Shortly after,
it was further concluded that any QBC protocol can-
not be unconditionally secure in principle [6–8]. This
result was called the Mayers-Lo-Chau (MLC) no-go the-
orem. It was considered as putting a serious drawback
on quantum cryptography. Though the result is widely
accepted nowadays, there is also doubt on the general-
ity of the theoretical model of QBC used in the no-go
proof, as it seems unconvincing that limited mathemat-
ical formulation can characterize all possible protocols
[9]. New protocols attempting to evade the no-go theo-
rem were proposed every now and then [10]-[28], though
most of them turned out to be unsuccessful [29, 30] or
at least failed to gain a wide recognition. Nevertheless,
these attempts stimulated the research on proving the
no-go theorem in more rigorous forms. Refs. [31–35] re-
viewed the original no-go proof with fuller explanations,
with some simple examples of insecure protocols given
in [31, 35]. Ref. [33] also extended the proof to cover
ideal quantum coin tossing. More complicated examples
on how to apply the no-go proof to break some quantum
as well as classical bit commitment (BC) protocols which
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looked promising at that time were provided in [36] and
[37], respectively. Refs. [38–40] further studied the se-
curity bounds of QBC quantitatively, with [39] focused
on the protocol in [3]. Refs. [41, 42] worked on a similar
direction, while focused especially on the class of pro-
tocols in [10]-[14]. Later on, a very detailed proof was
presented both in the Heisenberg picture [43] and the
Schro¨dinger picture [44], with the intention to achieve
a more rigorous bound on the concealment-bindingness
tradeoff that can apply to all conceivable QBC protocols
in which both classical and quantum information are ex-
changed, including [10, 18–20, 22]. It was also shown
that the no-go theorem remains valid in a world subject
to superselection rules [45–47], or for QBC associated
with secret parameters [48, 49], or when the participants
are restricted to use Gaussian states and operations only
[50]. Recent efforts also include [51, 52], which proved
the no-go theorem with alternative methods.
As the no-go theorem became well-accepted, people
started to discuss the possibility of building BC under
various security conditions, e.g., classical BC under rel-
ativistic settings [53, 54] or tamper-evident seals [55],
quantum relativistic BC [56, 57], computationally secure
QBC [58–61]. There are also QBC under experimental
limitations, such as individual measurements [62, 63] or
limited coherent measurements [64], misaligned reference
frames [65], limited or noisy quantum storage [66–71], un-
stability of particles [72, 73], Gaussian operations with
non-Gaussian states [74], etc. [75–78]. Some even con-
sidered BC in post-quantum theories [79]-[82]. Others
proposed less secure QBC [83, 84], variations of the defi-
nition of QBC, e.g., cheat-sensitive QBC [85–88], condi-
tionally secure QBC [89], etc. [90–93].
In this paper we still focus on the original QBC with-
out these conditions. Basing on an existing QKD scheme
using orthogonal states [94, 95], we show that it becomes
possible to build a QBC protocol, to which the no-go
proofs do not apply. This protocol enables many other
cryptographies, and is readily implementable with cur-
rently available technology. We also address the relation-
2ship between this finding and the Clifton-Bub-Halvorson
(CBH) theorem [96] which tries to characterize quantum
theory in terms of information-theoretic constraints.
QKD provides an unconditionally secure method for
two remote participants to transmit secret information
against any eavesdropper. Most existing QKD schemes
(e.g., [3, 97, 98]) use nonorthogonal states as carriers for
the transmitted information. Since quantum mechanics
guarantees that nonorthogonal states cannot be faithfully
cloned, any eavesdropping will inevitably introduce de-
tectable disturbance on the states. Thus the eavesdrop-
per will be caught once he gains a non-trivial amount of
information. For this reason, it was once believed that
nonorthogonal states are necessary for secure QKD. But
Goldenberg and Vaidman managed to present a scheme
based on orthogonal states [94]. This brilliant idea opens
yet another path for adopting more bizarre properties of
quantum mechanics for cryptography. We will use it as
the base of our current work.
Generally, in both QKD and QBC the two participants
are called Alice and Bob. But in our current proposal
of QBC, the actions of Bob is more similar to that of
the eavesdropper rather than the Bob in QKD. To avoid
confusion, in this paper we use the names in the following
way. In QKD, the sender of the secret information is
called Alice, the receiver is renamed as Charlie instead
of Bob, and the external eavesdropper is called Eve. In
QBC, the sender of the commitment is Alice, the receiver
is Bob, and there is no Eve since QBC merely deals with
the cheating from internal dishonest participants, instead
of external eavesdropping.
II. QKD SCHEME BASED ON ORTHOGONAL
STATES
The QKD scheme proposed in [94] is outlined below.
Consider the ideal case where no transmission error oc-
curs in the communication channels. Alice encodes the
bit values 0 and 1 she wants to transmit to Charlie, re-
spectively, using two orthogonal states
0 → |Ψ0〉 ≡ (|a〉+ |b〉)/
√
2,
1 → |Ψ1〉 ≡ (|a〉 − |b〉)/
√
2. (1)
Here |a〉 and |b〉 are the localized wave packets of the same
qubit. When sending these states to Charlie, two details
are important for the security of the scheme. First, |a〉
and |b〉 are not sent simultaneously, but separated by a
fixed delay time τ . The value of τ should ensure that |a〉
reached Charlie’s site before |b〉 leaves Alice’s site (for
simplicity, we do not study the case where τ is further
reduced, even though it may not hurt the security), so
that the two wave packets are never present together in
the transmission channels. Second, the sending time of
each |Ψ0〉 and |Ψ1〉 is random, and kept secret from Eve
until |a〉 already arrived.
FIG. 1 illustrated the diagram for an experimental im-
plementation of the scheme using Mach-Zehnder interfer-
ometer. Alice prepares |Ψ0〉 (|Ψ1〉) by sending a single
photon from the source S0 (S1), and then splits it into |a〉
and |b〉 using the beam splitter BS1. |a〉 is sent directly
to Charlie while |b〉 is delayed by the storage ring SR1
before sending. At Charlie’s site, |a〉 is delayed by the
storage ring SR2 and then meets |b〉 at the beam split-
ter BS2 and interferes. The delay times caused by SR1
and SR2 are tuned equal. Thus the complete apparatus
of Alice’s and Charlie’s forms a balanced Mach-Zehnder
interferometer, so that |Ψ0〉 (|Ψ1〉) will always make the
detector D0 (D1) click when no eavesdropping occurs, al-
lowing Charlie to decode the transmitted bit value. Alice
sends Charlie a series of |Ψ0〉 and |Ψ1〉, then announces
all the sending times and some of the encoded bits for
security check. If all announced results match with Char-
lie’s measurement, the two parties keep the unannounced
encoded bits as the secret key. It was shown that the
scheme is unconditionally secure [94, 95], since Eve can
never access to the entire states |Ψ0〉 and |Ψ1〉, unless
she intercepts and delays |a〉. But then she needs to send
Charlie a “dummy” state in advance to escape the de-
tection. However, without knowing Alice’s sending time
beforehand, Eve can hardly send the dummy state at the
proper time. Thus eavesdropping will be revealed once
Alice does not send any state while Charlie’s detectors
click after time τ .
III. OUR QBC PROTOCOL
QBC is a two-party cryptography including two
phases. In the commit phase, Alice (the sender of the
commitment) decides the value of the bit b (b = 0 or 1)
which she wants to commit, and sends Bob (the receiver
of the commitment) a piece of evidence, e.g., some quan-
tum states. Later, in the unveil phase, Alice announces
the value of b, and Bob checks it with the evidence. An
unconditionally secure QBC protocol needs to be both
binding (i.e., Alice cannot change the value of b after the
commit phase) and concealing (Bob cannot know b before
the unveil phase) without relying on any computational
assumption.
To make use of the QKD scheme in [94] for QBC, our
starting point is to treat Charlie’s site as a part of Alice’s,
so that the two parties merge into one. That is, Alice
sends out a bit-string encoded with the above orthogo-
nal states, whose value is related with the bit she wants
to commit. Then she receives the states herself. Mean-
while, let Bob take the role of Eve. His action shifts
between two modes. In the intercept mode, he applies
the intercept-resend attack to read parts of the string.
In the bypass mode, he simply does nothing so that the
corresponding parts of the states return to Alice intact.
Since the eavesdropping on every single bit of the string
has a non-trivial probability to escape Alice’s detection,
at the end of the process some bits of the string become
known to Bob, while Alice does not know the exact po-
sition of these bits. Thus she cannot alter the bit-string
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FIG. 1: Diagram of the experimental implementation of the QKD scheme based on orthogonal states [94]. The state of a
photon produced by the source S0 (S1) will become |Ψ0〉 = (|a〉 + |b〉)/
√
2 (|Ψ1〉 = (|a〉 − |b〉)/
√
2) after passing the beam
splitter BS1. The wave packets |a〉 and |b〉 are sent through channels A and B respectively. When no eavesdropper is present,
the storage rings SR1, SR2 and the mirrorsM1,M2 will ensure the complete apparatus work as a Mach-Zehnder interferometer
with balanced arms, so that |Ψ0〉 and |Ψ1〉 will be detected by the detectors D0 and D1, respectively.
freely at a later time, making the protocol binding. On
the other hand, Bob cannot eavesdrop the whole string
without being detected. Thus the value of the commit-
ted bit can be made concealing by putting a limit on the
error rate Bob allowed to make in the protocol.
The rigorous description of our QBC protocol is as
follows.
The commit protocol:
(1) Bob chooses a binary linear (n, k, d)-code C and
announces it to Alice, where n, k, d and another param-
eter s (s≫ n > k > d) are agreed on by both Alice and
Bob.
(2) Alice chooses a nonzero random n-bit string r =
(r1r2...rn) ∈ {0, 1}n and announces it to Bob. This
makes any n-bit codeword c = (c1c2...cn) in C sorted
into either of the two subsets C(0) ≡ {c ∈ C|c ⊙ r = 0}
and C(1) ≡ {c ∈ C|c⊙ r = 1}. Here c⊙ r ≡
n⊕
i=1
ci ∧ ri .
(3) Now Alice decides the value of the bit b that she
wants to commit. Then she chooses a codeword c from
C(b) randomly.
(4) Alice and Bob treat the timeline as a series of
discrete time instants t1, t2, ..., ts with equal inter-
vals. Alice encodes each bit of c as ci → |Ψci〉 ≡
(|ai〉+(−1)ci |bi〉)/
√
2 and sends them to Bob. The time
t(i) for sending each |Ψci〉 is randomly chosen among t1,
t2, ..., ts, while all t(i)’s (i = 1, 2, ..., n) should be chosen
in the sequence of i, i.e., there should be t(i1) < t(i2) for
any i1 < i2. Also, just as the QKD scheme in [94], the
two wave packets |ai〉 and |bi〉 of the same qubit |Ψci〉
are not sent simultaneously. When we say that |Ψci〉 is
sent at time t(i), we mean that |ai〉 is sent at time t(i),
while |bi〉 is delayed and then leaves Alice’s site at time
t(i) + τ . The delay time τ is fixed for all |Ψci〉’s and
known to Bob.
(5) At each of the time instants t1, t2, ..., ts, Bob
chooses the intercept mode with probability α and the
bypass mode with probability 1− α.
If he chooses to apply the intercept mode at time
tj (j ∈ {1, 2, ..., s}), he prepares a qubit in the state
|Ψ0〉 = (|aj〉 + |bj〉)/
√
2, sends the wave packet |aj〉 to
Alice at time tj , while |bj〉 is temporarily delayed. Mean-
while, Bob adds a delay circuit to the quantum commu-
nication channel A (where the wave packets |ai〉’s come
from Alice). At time tj + τ , he combines the output of
this delay circuit with the quantum communication chan-
nel B (where the wave packets |bi〉’s come from Alice),
and measures whether Alice has sent him |Ψ0〉, |Ψ1〉, or
nothing at all. If the result of the measurement is |Ψ0〉
(|Ψ1〉), he leaves his delayed |bj〉 unchanged (he intro-
duces a phase shift to change |bj〉 into − |bj〉) and sends
it to Alice. In this case, Bob learned the state Alice sent
at time tj while Alice cannot detect this action with cer-
tainty. But if Bob found nothing in his measurement, he
measures (or simply discards) |bj〉. In this case, Alice’s
detectors will click with probability 1/2 due to the pres-
ence of |aj〉, revealing that Bob is running the intercept
mode.
On the other hand, if Bob chooses to apply the bypass
mode at time tj , he simply keeps channel A intact at time
tj , and channel B intact at time tj + τ . Consequently, if
a state was sent from Alice at time tj , it will be returned
to her detectors as-is at time tj + τ .
(6) Alice uses the same apparatus that Bob used in the
intercept mode, to measure the output of the quantum
communication channels from Bob. She counts the total
number of the states she received from Bob, and denotes
it as n′. By analyzing step (5) it can be shown that n′ ∼
α(s−n)/2+n. Thus Alice can estimate the probability of
Bob choosing the intercept mode as α ∼ 2(n′−n)/(s−n).
Alice agrees to continue with the protocol if α < 1−d/n,
4which means that the number of ci’s known to Bob is
αn < n− d.
(7) Alice announces all the time instants t(i)’s at which
she sent |Ψci〉’s (i = 1, 2, ..., n). Bob checks that he in-
deed detected some states at each t(i) + τ and no detec-
tion was found at other times, as long as he has chosen
the intercept mode at the corresponding time instants.
This completes the commit phase.
The unveil protocol:
(8) Alice announces the values of b and c = (c1c2...cn).
(9) Bob accepts the commitment if c ⊙ r = b and c is
indeed a codeword from C, and every ci agrees with the
state |Ψci〉 he received in the intercept mode.
The diagram for implementing this protocol using the
Mach-Zehnder interferometer is shown in FIG. 2.
Intuitively, the protocol can achieve the goal of QBC
for the following reasons. The binary linear (n, k, d)-
code C can simply be viewed as a set of classical n-bit
strings. Each string is called a codeword. This set of
strings has two features. (A) Among all the 2n possi-
ble choices of n-bit strings, only a particular set of the
size ∼ 2k is selected to form this set. (B) The distance
(i.e., the number of different bits) between any two code-
words in this set is not less than d. Feature (A) puts
a limit on Alice’s freedom on choosing the initial state
|Ψc〉 ≡ |Ψc1〉 ⊗ |Ψc2〉 ⊗ ... ⊗ |Ψcn〉. Meanwhile, feature
(B) guarantees that if Alice wants to change the string
c from one codeword into another, she needs to change
at least d qubits of |Ψc〉. But the intercept mode in the
protocol enables Bob to learn about αn bits of the string
c, while Alice does not know all the positions of these
bits in c with certainty. Therefore, when Alice alters the
codeword corresponding to |Ψc〉, the probability for her
to escape the detection will be only at the order of mag-
nitude of (1 − α)d. By increasing d, the security of the
protocol against Alice’s cheating will be strengthened.
On the other hand, feature (A) also guarantees that the
number of different codewords having less than n−d bits
in common increases exponentially with k. That is, as
Bob knows only αn < n−d bits of c, the potential choices
for c are too much for him to determine whether c be-
longs to the subset C(0) or C(1). Thus his knowledge on
the committed bit b before the unveil phase can be made
arbitrarily close to zero by increasing k. Fixing k/n and
d/n while increasing n will then result in a protocol se-
cure against both parties.
Note that when n → ∞ with k/n, d/n, and α fixed,
the probabilities for Alice and Bob to cheat successfully
in our protocol will both drop arbitrarily close to 0, but
they never strictly equal to 0. As defined in [7, 99], if
a protocol can make the probability of successful cheat-
ing strictly equal to 0, then it is considered as “perfectly
secure”. On the other hand, when speaking of “uncon-
ditionally secure”, it generally implies that the protocol
should meet two requirements simultaneously. (I) Theo-
retically, the security of the protocol must be based di-
rectly on fundamental laws of physics (e.g., the validity of
the postulates of quantum mechanics or relativity) alone
rather than computational assumptions. (II) Quantita-
tively, the probability of successful cheating does not
equal to 0, but can be made arbitrarily close to 0 by
increasing some security parameters of the protocol. To
emphasize the second meaning, some people use the term
“information-theoretically secure” interchangeably with
“unconditionally secure” [46]. So we can see that our
protocol falls into this category. This is already the best
we could expect from quantum cryptography so far. For
example, the BCJL93 QBC protocol [4] tried to reduce
the probability of successful cheating down to exactly the
same level (i.e., arbitrarily close but not equal to 0), but
proven failure by [5]. Ref. [38] also showed that perfectly
secure QBC is impossible. The protocols proposed in it
is even less secure, as at least one of the probabilities of
Alice’s and Bob’s successful cheating can never be made
arbitrarily close to 0. In fact, even the well-known BB84
QKD protocol [3] is not perfectly secure. This is because
the eavesdropper Eve can always perform the most basic
intercept-resend attack. That is, she intercepts any quan-
tum state from the sender, measure it in a basis which
she chooses simply by guess, then resends the resultant
state to the receiver. While she stands a great chance to
be detected whenever her guess is wrong, we can never
neglect the probability that she can be so lucky that she
guesses all the bases correctly. Even though this prob-
ability is extremely small, and drops arbitrarily close to
0 with the increase of the number of states used in the
protocol, still it never strictly equal to 0. Nevertheless,
QKD is still considered as the most secure communica-
tion method of today. Thus we see that an uncondition-
ally secure protocol is already good enough.
Under practical settings, some steps of our protocol
may need minor modifications. For example, the proto-
col can be made fault-tolerant as long as d/n is chosen to
be much larger than the transmission error rate ε of the
quantum channels. This is because the distance between
any two codewords is not less than d. Even if a dishonest
Alice replaces the channels with noiseless ones so that she
can alter up to εn bits of the string c while blaming it
on the transmission error, it is still insufficient to change
a codeword into another one so that her committed bit
b will not be altered. For this reason, in step (9) Bob
can in fact allow the mismatched results between Alice’s
announced ci and Bob’s received |Ψci〉 occur with a prob-
ability not greater than ε, thus makes the protocol fully
functional with noisy channels. Also, in real settings the
physical systems implementing the qubits may have other
degrees of freedom, which leave rooms for some technical
cheating strategies. For instance, Alice may send photons
with certain polarization or frequency, so that she can
distinguish them from the photons Bob sends in the in-
tercept mode. In this case, Bob and Alice should discuss
at the beginning of the protocol, to limit these degrees of
freedom to a single mode. In step (5) when Bob chooses
the intercept mode, he should also measure occasionally
these degrees of freedom of some of Alice’s photons, in-
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FIG. 2: Diagram for the apparatus of the QBC protocol when Bob chooses the intercept mode. At time tj , he delays anything
coming from channel A, produces |Ψ0〉 = (|a〉 + |b〉)/
√
2 using the source S0, and sends the wave packet |a〉 to Alice while
delaying |b〉. At time tj + τ , he measures the state from Alice. If the detector D0 clicks, he sends the delayed wave packet |b〉
to Alice directly. Else if the detector D1 clicks, he changes |b〉 to − |b〉 using the phase shifter PS before sending. If none of D0
and D1 clicks, he discards |b〉. On the other hand, if Bob chooses the bypass mode at time tj , he simply removes any device in
his box and let channel A (channel B) pass through to Alice intact at time tj (at time tj + τ ).
stead of performing the measurement in the original step
(5). Then if Alice wants to send distinguishable photons
with a high probability so that they are sufficient for her
cheating, she will inevitably be detected. Another exam-
ple is given in the appendix showing how to deal with
the counterfactual attack.
IV. SECURITY
Since the number of potential cheating strategies could
be infinite, in this work we do not attempt to prove that
our protocol is unconditionally secure against any strat-
egy. What will be shown here is that our protocol is
at least not covered by the cheating strategy used in
the MLC no-go theorem that makes all previous QBC
schemes insecure.
Briefly, the MLC no-go theorem and all its variations
[5–8], [31]-[52] have the following common features.
(i) The reduced model. According to the no-go proofs,
any QBC protocol can be reduced to the following model.
Alice and Bob together own a quantum state in a given
Hilbert space. Each of them performs unitary transfor-
mations on the state in turns. All measurements are
performed at the very end.
(ii) The coding method. The quantum state corre-
sponding to the committed bit b has the form
|ψb〉 =
∑
j
λ
(b)
j
∣∣∣e(b)j 〉
A
⊗
∣∣∣f (b)j 〉
B
. (2)
Here the systems A and B are owned by Alice and Bob
respectively, {
∣∣∣e(b)j 〉
A
} is an orthogonal basis of system
A while
∣∣∣f (b)j 〉
B
’s are not necessarily orthogonal to each
other.
(iii) The concealing condition. To ensure that Bob’s
information on the committed bit is trivial before the un-
veil phase, any QBC protocol secure against Bob should
satisfy
ρB0 ≃ ρB1 , (3)
where ρBb ≡ TrA |ψb〉 〈ψb| is the reduced density matrix of
the state sent to Bob corresponding to Alice’s committed
bit b. Note that in some presentation of the no-go proofs
(e.g. [38, 40, 43, 50]), this feature was expressed using
the trace distance or the fidelity instead of the reduced
density matrices, while the meaning remains the same.
(iv) The cheating strategy. As long as Eq. (3) is satis-
fied, there exists a local unitary transformation for Alice
to map |ψ0〉 into |ψ1〉 successfully with a high probabil-
ity [100]. Thus a dishonest Alice can unveil the state
as either |ψ0〉 or |ψ1〉 at her will with a high probability
to escape Bob’s detection. For this reason, a concealing
QBC protocol cannot be binding.
The key that makes our protocol evade the no-go
proofs is that it does not have the feature (iii). As
shown in Eq. (1), every bit value ci in our proto-
col are encoded with orthogonal states. Therefore the
state |Ψc〉 ≡ |Ψc1〉 ⊗ |Ψc2〉 ⊗ ... ⊗ |Ψcn〉 correspond-
ing to a codeword c is orthogonal to any other state
|Ψc′〉 ≡
∣∣Ψc′1〉⊗ ∣∣Ψc′2〉⊗ ...⊗ ∣∣Ψc′n〉 corresponding to a dif-
ferent codeword c′. Consequently, the two Hilbert spaces
6supported by the states corresponding to the codeword
subsets C(0) and C(1) respectively are completely orthog-
onal to each other. Therefore it is obvious that our pro-
tocol satisfies ρB0 ⊥ ρB1 instead of Eq. (3). Then Al-
ice’s cheating strategy (iv) will no longer apply because
the corresponding unitary transformation does not ex-
ist without Eq. (3). Since all existing no-go proofs of
unconditionally secure QBC [5–8], [31]-[52] have the fea-
ture ρB0 ≃ ρB1 , we can see that they all fail to cover our
protocol.
Let us elaborate in more details. The existence of Al-
ice’s cheating strategy in the no-go proofs is backed by
the Hughston-Jozsa-Wootters (HJW) theorem [100] bas-
ing on Schmidt decomposition. Following the manner of
[31], it can be expressed in simple words as:
The HJW theorem: Let f1, f2, ..., fm and f
′
1, f
′
2, ...,
f ′n be two sets of possible quantum states with associated
probabilities described by an identical density matrix ρ.
It is possible to construct a composite system A⊗B such
that B alone has density matrix ρ and such that there
exists a pair of measurements M , M ′ with the property
that applying M (resp. M ′) to A yields an index j of
state fj (resp. f
′
j) to which B will have collapsed.
Now consider a QBC protocol which requires Alice to
encode the committed b in the state
|ψb=0〉 =
∑
j
λ
(0)
j
∣∣∣e(0)j 〉
A
⊗
∣∣∣f (0)j 〉
B
, (4)
or
|ψb=1〉 =
∑
j
λ
(1)
j
∣∣∣e(1)j 〉
A
⊗
∣∣∣f (1)j 〉
B
, (5)
respectively, where the meaning of the notations are the
same as that of Eq. (2). When the concealing condition
ρB0 ≃ ρB1 is satisfied, according to the HJW theorem there
exists another basis {
∣∣e′j〉A} of system A with which we
can rewrite Eq. (4) as
|ψb=0〉 =
∑
j
λ′j
∣∣e′j〉A ⊗
∣∣∣f (1)j 〉
B
. (6)
Comparing with Eq. (5), we can see that |ψb=0〉 differs
from |ψb=1〉 only by a local unitary transformation UA of
Alice which maps {
∣∣e′j〉A} into {
∣∣∣e(1)j 〉
A
}. That is, with
this transformation, Alice can alter the commitment in
the unveil phase by herself. The actual cheating proce-
dure is as follows. Alice always uses |ψb=0〉 to execute
the commit protocol regardless the value of b. Later,
if she wants to unveil b = 0, she simply measures sys-
tem A in the basis {
∣∣∣e(0)j 〉
A
} to collapse system B into
a certain
∣∣∣f (0)j 〉
B
(where j is determined by the quan-
tum uncertainty in the measurement). Else if she wants
to unveil b = 1, she rotates her basis to {
∣∣e′j〉A} so that
the corresponding measurement can collapse system B
to a certain
∣∣∣f (1)j 〉
B
. Even if she is required to transfer
system A to Bob for verification, all she needs to do is
to further apply the local unitary transformation UA on
system A to rotate
∣∣e′j〉A into
∣∣∣e(1)j 〉
A
. Thus she can al-
ways unveil b = 0 successfully with the probability 100%,
while unveiling b = 1 can also be successful with a very
high probability (which can reach 100% when ρB0 equals
to ρB1 exactly). Namely, Alice can cheat because there
are two different bases for system A, both of which can
lead to a legitimate outcome in the unveil phase.
But in our QBC protocol, as the state |Ψc〉 sent to Bob
satisfies ρB0 ⊥ ρB1 , |ψb=0〉 can no longer be expressed as
the superposition of the components of |ψb=1〉 like Eq.
(6). Consequently, even if Alice introduces an ancillary
system A entangled with many different |Ψc〉’s in the
form of Eq. (2), there will be no alternative basis for
Alice to alter her commitment. Instead, unveiling b = 0
and b = 1 will be performed in the same basis. This
can be seen from the following analysis. Let H denote
the Hilbert space of the composite system A ⊗ B sup-
ported by all possible committed states. Let H0 (H1) be
its subspace supported by all the states encoding b = 0
(b = 1), with {
∣∣∣g(0)j 〉
A⊗B
} ({
∣∣∣g(1)j 〉
A⊗B
}) denoting one
of its basis. The condition ρB0 ⊥ ρB1 indicates that H0
and H1 have no overlap at all. Therefore {
∣∣∣g(0)j 〉
A⊗B
}
and {
∣∣∣g(1)j 〉
A⊗B
} share no state in common. Any Al-
ice’s local unitary transformation UA on system A can
be extended as U ≡ UA ⊗ IB , which becomes a uni-
tary transformation on the composite system A ⊗ B.
Here IB is the identity operator on system B. Obvi-
ously any U in this form cannot map {
∣∣∣g(0)j 〉
A⊗B
} into
{
∣∣∣g(1)j 〉
A⊗B
}. Thus Alice’s actions for unveiling b = 0 and
b = 1, respectively, are not related with each other by a
local unitary transformation of her own. Instead, the set
{
∣∣∣g(0)j 〉
A⊗B
,
∣∣∣g(1)j 〉
A⊗B
} = {
∣∣∣g(0)j 〉
A⊗B
} ∪ {
∣∣∣g(1)j 〉
A⊗B
}
forms a single complete orthogonal basis of the global
space H = H0 ⊕ H1, as either of {
∣∣∣g(0)j 〉
A⊗B
} and
{
∣∣∣g(1)j 〉
A⊗B
} alone is incomplete. Therefore, when writ-
ing out the Schmidt decomposition of the committed
state in forms of Eqs. (4) and (5), the states
∣∣∣f (0)j 〉
B
and
∣∣∣f (1)j 〉
B
belong to the same basis, instead of two
different bases nonorthogonal to each other. As a result,
comparing with the description of the HJW theorem, now
f
(0)
1 , f
(0)
2 , ..., f
(0)
m and f
(1)
1 , f
(1)
2 , ..., f
(1)
n together form a
single set of orthogonal quantum states with associated
probability described by a density matrix ρ. When con-
structing a composite system A ⊗ B such that B alone
has density matrix ρ, the “two” measurements M , M ′
(with the property that applying M (resp. M ′) to A
yields an index j of state f
(0)
j (resp. f
(1)
j ) to which B
will have collapsed) now both become incomplete mea-
7surements on system A. Together they form one single
complete measurement set. {
∣∣∣e(0)j 〉
A
} and {
∣∣∣e(1)j 〉
A
} in
Eqs. (4) and (5) now both belong to the same single
orthogonal basis of system A corresponding to this com-
plete measurement. No matter what value Alice wants to
unveil, her action is always to perform the measurement
in this basis. Which one of the unveiled values will finally
be obtained is determined by the form of the state Alice
prepared in the commit phase, and the quantum uncer-
tainty in the unveil measurement (if Alice has prepared
the state in the form of Eq. (7), which we will discuss
in more details in the next section). Either way, it is
not determined by Alice’s different actions in the unveil
phase, as there does not exist a second legitimate action
at all. If Alice insists to measure in a different basis other
than {
∣∣∣e(0)j 〉
A
} ∪ {
∣∣∣e(1)j 〉
A
}, it will not lead to any spe-
cific legitimate unveiled outcome with certainty, because
it will collapse the state of each qubit she sent to Bob
into |Ψ〉 = cos θ |a〉 + sin θ |b〉 (where θ 6= kpi ± pi/4, k is
an integer) or similar forms, instead of Eq. (1). Thus
it will only increase the probability for her cheating to
be detected. Therefore we see that the feature ρB0 ⊥ ρB1
eliminates the existence of a second legitimate measure-
ment basis, making Alice’s cheating strategy described in
the previous paragraph futile in our protocol.
In fact, similar characters can also be found in a bit
commitment protocol proposed by Kent [53], which bases
its security on relativity instead of quantum mechanics.
As pointed out in the 3rd paragraph of the introduction
of [47], “Kent’s relativistic bit commitment protocol does
not rely on the existence of alternative decompositions of
a density operator, and so its security is not challenged
by the Mayers-Lo-Chau result.” As our protocol uses or-
thogonal states to encode the committed bit, it does not
rely on alternative decompositions either. Thus it can
evade the MLC theorem for the same reason.
On the other hand, our protocol is still concealing
against Bob despite that ρB0 ⊥ ρB1 . The MLC theo-
rem suggests that protocols satisfying this condition can-
not be secure, because Bob can always perform a mea-
surement which optimally distinguishes ρB0 and ρ
B
1 , thus
learns the value of b without Alice’s help. But in our
protocol, even though ρB0 and ρ
B
1 are distinguishable the-
oretically as the states are orthogonal, Bob is unable to
perform the corresponding measurement before the un-
veil phase while escaping Alice’s detection. This is be-
cause the protocol puts a limit on the number of qubits
that he is allowed to measure, as he is required to ap-
ply the intercept mode with probability α < 1 − d/n
only. So the key question is whether a dishonest Bob can
make his intercept mode indistinguishable with the by-
pass mode to Alice with a probability higher than it was
evaluated in step (5) of our protocol. This is prevented
by two important features of the QKD scheme [94] on
which our QBC protocol is based. First, the use of the
storage rings makes the two wave packets of each sin-
gle qubit of Alice never presented simultaneously in the
quantum channels. This prevents Bob from knowing the
arrival of Alice’s qubit in time by measuring channel A
alone, as it will disturb the state of the qubit and make
the intercept mode lose its advantage of distinguishing
Alice’s state. Secondly, Alice’s sending time is random
and kept secret until step (7). Therefore in step (5) Bob
has to decide himself whether to send |Ψ0〉 into the quan-
tum channels to Alice, before he can be sure whether he
will detect a qubit in the quantum channels from Alice.
He cannot avoid the case where he sent |Ψ0〉 to Alice,
while finds out later that Alice has not sent him a qubit
at the corresponding time instant. Then his interception
will be revealed once Alice detects |Ψ0〉, just as expected
in the protocol. Thus a dishonest Bob intercepting more
qubits than allowed will inevitably introduce a very high
estimated value of α in step (6), so that the cheating will
be revealed.
More generally, if there exists a strategy enabling Bob
to intercept most of Alice’s qubit without being detected,
then in the QKD scheme [94], an eavesdropper will be
able to apply the same strategy to gain a non-trivial
amount of information of the secret key while escaping
the detection too. But there were already many studies
on the scheme in [94] proving that it is indeed uncon-
ditionally secure [94, 95, 101–103]. Therefore all these
proofs can be regarded as further supports on the secu-
rity of our protocol.
In short, the use of orthogonal states make our protocol
evade Alice’s cheating strategy suggested by the no-go
proofs, while the security against Bob is provided by the
security of the QKD scheme on which our QBC protocol
is based.
V. LIMITATIONS AND APPLICATIONS
Nevertheless, our protocol has the limitation that it
cannot force Alice to commit to a classical bit. Alice can
skip step (3). Then in step (4), instead of choosing a
particular codeword c and preparing the system B to be
sent to Bob in the state |Ψc〉 ≡ |Ψc1〉⊗|Ψc2〉⊗ ...⊗|Ψcn〉,
she introduces an ancillary system A and prepares the
state of the incremented system A ⊗ B in an entangled
form as
|A⊗B〉 =
∑
c∈C
λc |ec〉 ⊗ |Ψc〉
=
∑
c∈C(0)
λc |ec〉 ⊗ |Ψc〉+
∑
c∈C(1)
λc |ec〉 ⊗ |Ψc〉 .
(7)
Here {|ec〉} is a set of orthogonal states that forms a basis
of system A. Alice keeps system A at her side unmea-
sured, and sends system B to Bob to complete the rest of
the commit protocol. By the time she needs to unveil the
committed b, she completes the measurement on system
A and knows which |Ψc〉 system B collapsed to. With
8this method, she can learn what can be announced as the
value of the codeword c (and therefore b) without con-
flicting with Bob’s measurement. As a consequence, her
commitment was kept at the quantum level until the un-
veil phase. But we must note that this problem, accord-
ing to Sec. III of [99], “is not considered a security failure
of a quantum BC protocol per se”. This is because, as
we shown above, our protocol has the feature ρB0 ⊥ ρB1 ,
i.e., all |Ψc〉’s corresponding to the codewords c ∈ C(0)
are orthogonal to these corresponding to c ∈ C(1). Thus
the probability for the state Eq. (7) to be unveiled as
b = 0 successfully is
p0 =
∑
c∈C(0)
|λc|2 , (8)
while the probability for it to be unveiled as b = 1 is
p1 =
∑
c∈C(1)
|λc|2 . (9)
The normalization condition for Eq. (7) gives
p0 + p1 = 1. (10)
Therefore, despite that our protocol cannot force Alice to
commit to a particular classical value of b, she is forced
to commit to a probability distribution (p0, p1) once she
prepared the state of A⊗B in step (4). She can no longer
change the value of either p0 or p1 later. The final value
of the unveiled b is completely out of her control. Instead,
it is determined by the quantum uncertainty in her final
measurement on the system A. As stated clearly in [99],
when Eq. (10) is satisfied, the protocol already meets the
requirement of what is defined as unconditionally secure
QBC. Note that the relativistic bit commitment proto-
col [53] is well-accepted as being unconditionally secure,
even though it has exactly the same problem. Most pre-
vious QBC protocols are considered insecure because the
corresponding p0+p1 is larger and cannot be made arbi-
trarily close to 1. In fact in some of these protocols (e.g.,
[3, 4]), p0 + p1 even reaches or is arbitrarily close to 2.
On the other hand, if a protocol can force Alice to com-
mit to a particular classical b, i.e., besides p0 + p1 = 1,
both p0 and p1 can only take the values 0 or 1 instead of
any value in between, then it is called a bit commitment
with a certificate of classicality (BCCC) [99]. Namely,
our protocol is a QBC but not a BCCC.
The difference between QBC and BCCC makes it im-
portant to re-examine the relationship between BC and
other cryptographic tasks at the quantum level. For ex-
ample, though BC and oblivious transfer (OT) [2, 104]
are equivalent at the classical level, our QBC protocol
may not lead to unconditionally secure quantum OT
(QOT) [1, 105], at least, not in the traditional way de-
scribed in these references. Note that there are many
variations of OT [2], e.g., 1-out-of-2 OT [105, 106]. Here
we use the original one [1, 104] (also called all-or-nothing
OT) as an example. It is defined as the following process.
Alice wants to transfer a secret bit b ∈ {0, 1} to Bob. At
the end of the protocol, either Bob could learn the value
of b with the reliability (which means the probability for
Bob’s output b to be equal to Alice’s input) 100%, or he
has zero knowledge on b. Each case should occur with
the probability 1/2, and which one finally happens is out
of their control. Meanwhile, Alice should learn nothing
about which case takes place. According to Sec. 2 of [1],
QOT can be built upon BC as follows.
The QOT protocol:
(I) Let |0, 0〉 and |0, 1〉 be two orthogonal states of a
qubit, and define |1, 0〉 ≡ (|0, 0〉 + |0, 1〉)/√2, |1, 1〉 ≡
(|0, 0〉−|0, 1〉)/√2. That is, the state of a qubit is denoted
as |ai, gi〉, where ai represents the basis and gi distin-
guishes the two states in the same basis. For i = 1, ..., n,
Alice randomly picks ai, gi ∈ {0, 1} and sends Bob a qubit
φi in the state |ai, gi〉.
(II) For i = 1, ..., n, Bob randomly picks a basis bi ∈
{0, 1} to measure φi and records the result as |bi, hi〉.
Then he commits (bi, hi) to Alice using the BC protocol.
(III) Alice randomly picks a subset R ⊆ {1, ..., n} and
tests Bob’s commitment at positions in R. If any i ∈ R
reveals ai = bi and gi 6= hi, then Alice stops the protocol;
otherwise, the test result is accepted.
(IV) Alice announces the bases ai (i = 1, ..., n). Let T0
be the set of all 1 ≤ i ≤ n with ai = bi, and T1 be the set
of all 1 ≤ i ≤ n with ai 6= bi. Bob chooses I0 ⊆ T0 − R,
I1 ⊆ T1 − R with |I0| = |I1| = 0.24n, and sends {I0, I1}
in random order to Alice.
(V) Alice picks a random s ∈ {0, 1}, and sends s, βs =
b
⊕
i∈Is
gi to Bob. Bob computes b = βs
⊕
i∈Is
hi if Is ⊆ T0;
otherwise does nothing.
If QBC instead of BCCC is used as the BC protocol
in step (II), Bob can make use of its limitation to en-
able a so-called honest-but-curious attack [107–110], as
shown below. For each φi (i = 1, ..., n), Bob does not
pick a classical bi and measure it in step (II). Instead,
he introduces two ancillary qubit systems Bi and Hi as
the storages for the bits bi and hi, and prepares their
initial states as |Bi〉 = (|0〉B+ |1〉B)/
√
2 and |Hi〉 = |0〉H
respectively. Here |0〉 and |1〉 are orthogonal. Then he
applies the unitary transformation
U1 ≡ |0〉B 〈0| ⊗ |0, 0〉φ 〈0, 0| ⊗ IH
+ |0〉B 〈0| ⊗ |0, 1〉φ 〈0, 1| ⊗ σ(x)H
+ |1〉B 〈1| ⊗ |1, 0〉φ 〈1, 0| ⊗ IH
+ |1〉B 〈1| ⊗ |1, 1〉φ 〈1, 1| ⊗ σ(x)H (11)
on the incremented system Bi ⊗ φi ⊗ Hi. Here IH and
σ
(x)
H are the identity operator and Pauli matrix of system
Hi that satisfy IH |0〉H = |0〉H and σ(x)H |0〉H = |1〉H , re-
spectively. The effect of U1 is like running a quantum
computer program that if |Bi〉 = |0〉B (|Bi〉 = |1〉B) then
measures qubit φi in the basis bi = 0 (bi = 1), and stores
9the result hi in system Hi. It is different from a classical
program with the same function as no destructive mea-
surement is really performed, since U1 is not a projective
operator. Consequently, the bits bi and hi are kept at
the quantum level instead of being collapsed to classical
values.
Bob then commits (bi, hi) to Alice at the quantum
level. This can always be done in a QBC protocol which
does not satisfy the definition of BCCC. For example, to
commit bi in our QBC protocol, Bob further introduces
two ancillary systems E and Ψ and prepares the initial
state as
|E ⊗Ψ〉0 = N
∑
c∈C(0)
|ec〉 ⊗ |Ψc〉 , (12)
where N is the normalization constant. Let UE⊗Ψ be a
unitary transformation on E ⊗ Ψ which can map each
|ec〉 ⊗ |Ψc〉 (c ∈ C(0)) into a |ec〉 ⊗ |Ψc〉 (c ∈ C(1)), i.e.,
it satisfies UE⊗Ψ |E ⊗Ψ〉0 = N
∑
c∈C(1)
|ec〉 ⊗ |Ψc〉. Bob
applies the unitary transformation
U2 ≡ |0〉B 〈0| ⊗ IE⊗Ψ + |1〉B 〈1| ⊗ UE⊗Ψ (13)
on the incremented system Bi⊗E⊗Ψ, where IE⊗Ψ is the
identity operator of system E ⊗ Ψ. As a result, we can
see that the final state of Bi⊗φi⊗Hi⊗E⊗Ψ will be very
similar to Eq. (7) if we view Bi⊗φi⊗Hi⊗E as system A.
Then Bob can follow the process after Eq. (7) (note that
now Bob becomes the sender of the commitment while
Alice becomes the receiver) to complete the commitment
of bi without collapsing it to a classical value. He can do
the same to hi.
Back to step (III) of the QOT protocol. Whenever
(bi, hi) (i ∈ R) are picked to test the commitment, Bob
simply unveils them honestly. Since these (bi, hi) will no
longer be useful in the remaining steps of the protocol, it
does not hurt Bob’s cheating. Note that the rest (bi, hi)
(i /∈ R) are still kept at the quantum level. After Alice
announced all bases ai (i = 1, ..., n) in step (IV), Bob
introduces a single global control qubit S′ for all i, ini-
tialized in the state |s′〉 = (|0〉S′ + |1〉S′)/
√
2, and yet
another ancillary system Γi for each i ∈ T0 ∪ T1 − R
initialized in the state |Γi〉 = |0〉Γ. Then he applies the
unitary transformation
U3 ≡ |0〉S′ 〈0| ⊗ |ai〉B 〈ai| ⊗ IΓ
+ |0〉S′ 〈0| ⊗ |¬ai〉B 〈¬ai| ⊗ σ(x)Γ
+ |1〉S′ 〈1| ⊗ |ai〉B 〈ai| ⊗ σ(x)Γ
+ |1〉S′ 〈1| ⊗ |¬ai〉B 〈¬ai| ⊗ IΓ (14)
on the incremented system S′⊗Bi⊗Γi. Here IΓ and σ(x)Γ
are the identity operator and Pauli matrix of system Γi
that satisfies IΓ |0〉Γ = |0〉Γ and σ(x)Γ |0〉Γ = |1〉Γ, respec-
tively. The effect of U3 is to compare ai with bi and store
the result (ai 6= bi) ⊕ s′ in Γi. Bob then measures all Γi
(i ∈ T0 ∪ T1 −R) in the basis {|0〉Γ , |1〉Γ}, takes T0 (T1)
as the set of all 1 ≤ i ≤ n with |Γi〉 = |0〉Γ (|Γi〉 = |1〉Γ)
instead of how they are defined in step (IV), and finishes
the rest parts of the QOT protocol.
With this method, the division of I0, I1 are kept at the
quantum level. Let I= (I6=) denote the set corresponding
to ai = bi (ai 6= bi). We can see that U3 makes I0 = I=,
I1 = I6= when s
′ = 0, while I0 = I6=, I1 = I= when s
′ = 1.
Since S′ was initialized as |s′〉 = (|0〉S′ + |1〉S′)/
√
2, the
actual result of step (IV) can be described by∣∣∣∣∣S′ ⊗ (
⊗
i
Bi ⊗ φi ⊗Hi ⊗ E′i)
〉
→ |Φb〉 = (|0〉S′ ⊗ |I0 = I= ∨ I1 = I6=〉
+ |1〉S′ ⊗ |I0 = I6= ∨ I1 = I=〉)/
√
2, (15)
where E′i stands for all the ancillary systems Bob intro-
duced in the process of committing (bi, hi). Suppose that
Bob announces {I0, I1} in their original order to Alice.
i.e., he never announces them in the order {I1, I0}. After
Alice announced s and βs in step (V), the systems under
Bob’s possession can be viewed as
|Φb〉 = (|s〉S′ ⊗ |Is = I=〉+ |¬s〉S′ ⊗ |fail〉)/
√
2. (16)
It means that if Bob measures system S′ in the basis
{|0〉S′ , |1〉S′} and the result |s′〉S′ satisfies s′ = s, then
he is able to measure the rest systems and decode the
secret bit b unambiguously; else, if the result satisfies
s′ 6= s, then he knows that he fails to decode b. Now
the most tricky part is, as the value of s′ was kept at
the quantum level before system S′ is measured, that at
this stage a dishonest Bob can choose not to measure S′
in the basis {|0〉S′ , |1〉S′}. Instead, by denoting |b〉 ≡|s〉S′ ⊗ |Is = I=〉, and |?〉 ≡ |¬s〉S′ ⊗ |fail〉, Eq. (16) be-
comes |Φb〉 = (|b〉+ |?〉)/
√
2 where |b = 0〉 ≡ ( 1 0 0 )T ,
|b = 1〉 ≡ ( 0 1 0 )T , and |?〉 ≡ ( 0 0 1 )T are mutually
orthogonal. Then according to Eq. (33) of [107], Bob
can distinguish them using the positive operator-valued
measure (POVM) (E0, I − E0), where
E0 =
1
6

 2 +
√
3 −1 1 +√3
−1 2−√3 1−√3
1 +
√
3 1−√3 2

 . (17)
This allows Bob’s decoded b to match Alice’s actual
input with reliability (1 +
√
3/2)/2. On the contrary,
when Bob executes the QOT protocol honestly, in 1/2
of the cases he can decode b with reliability 100%; in
the rest 1/2 cases where he fails to decode b, he can
guess the value randomly, which results in a reliability of
50%. Thus the average reliability in the honest case is
100%/2 + 50%/2 = 75% < (1 +
√
3/2)/2. Note that in
the above dishonest strategy, in any case Bob can never
decode b with reliability 100%. Therefore it is debatable
whether it can be considered as a successful cheating, as
the strategy does not even accomplish what an honest
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Bob can do. That is why it is called honest -but-curious
behavior [108, 109]. The existence of this loophole may
actually come from the fact that in the literature, there
is the lack of a self-consistent definition of OT specifically
made for the quantum case. That is, the goal “reaching
reliability 100% and 50% with equal probabilities” may
conflict with “reaching a maximal average reliability 75%
with probability 100%” by nature, so that it seems unre-
alistic to require a protocol to satisfy both goals simul-
taneously. Therefore it is somewhat unfair to consider
it as a limitation on the power of quantum cryptogra-
phy itself. Nevertheless, as this honest-but-curious be-
havior provides Bob with the freedom to choose between
accomplishing the original goal of QOT and achieving a
higher average reliability, it may leave rooms for potential
problems when we want to build even more complicated
cryptographic protocols upon such a QBC based QOT.
Despite of this limitation, our QBC protocol can still
be used to build many other “post-cold-war era” multi-
party quantum cryptographic protocols. For example,
since it makes committing a single bit possible, then re-
peating the protocol many times immediately enables
quantum bit string commitment (QBSC) [111]. Also,
building quantum strong coin tossing (QCT, a.k.a. quan-
tum coin flipping) [3] with an arbitrarily small bias is
straight forward. Alice and Bob first execute our commit
protocol. Then Bob announces a random bit x classically.
Finally, Alice unveils her committed bit b, and the two
parties accept y ≡ b ⊕ x as the coin tossing result. It is
trivial to show that even if Alice kept b at the quantum
level until the unveil phase by using the state Eq. (7),
she cannot bias the final y since she cannot change the
probabilities p0, p1. Note that these results suggest that
all the existing no-go proofs of QBSC (e.g., [112, 113])
and QCT (e.g., [33, 114–117]) are incorrect. This is not
surprising, because all these no-go proofs are also based
on some conditions similar to ρB0 ≃ ρB1 , or even built di-
rectly on top of the no-go theorem of QBC, which are all
inapplicable to our case.
VI. FEASIBILITY
Our protocol is very feasible. The QKD scheme [94]
we based on was already experimentally implemented re-
cently [102]. By comparing Figs. 1 and 2 it can clearly be
seen that our QBC protocol can be implemented with ex-
actly the same devices in [102]. Thus the QBSC and QCT
protocols built upon our QBC protocol are also straight
forward with currently available technology. Moreover,
as mentioned in Sec. 3, the protocol can easily be made
fault-tolerant against noisy quantum channels. Therefore
it is extremely practical.
Comparing with the unconditionally secure BC pro-
tocols based on relativity [53, 54, 56, 57], our protocol
reaches the same security level, while the implementation
is more convenient. This is because in all these relativis-
tic BC, both Alice and Bob must have agents to help
them carrying out the protocols. Therefore, it is in fact
no longer a two-party cryptography, as what BC should
have been. Also, Alice and Bob must be separated from
their agents by a distance on the relativistic scale, i.e.,
they need to be so far apart that they cannot exchange
information in time. All these requirements obviously
limit the application of their protocols.
In [103] a variation of the QKD scheme in [94] was pro-
posed, which replaced the symmetric (equal transmissiv-
ity and reflectivity) beam splitters BS1 and BS2 in our
FIG. 1 with asymmetric ones. The advantage is that the
sending time of the qubits no longer needs to be random.
The same idea may also apply to our protocol to bring
the same advantage.
However, it is important to note that the beam split-
ters can be half-silvered mirrors or similar types, but
must not be polarizing beam splitters. This is because
the QKD scheme [94] we based on will become insecure if
polarizing beam splitters are used. Let |H〉 (|V 〉) denote
the horizontally (vertically) polarized state that will al-
ways be transmitted (reflected) by polarizing beam split-
ters. Eve can simply use the same device of Charlie to
measure all states come from Alice. Then, depending
on which one of her detectors clicks, she can send |H〉
(|V 〉) to Charlie through channel B (in FIG. 1) only, let
alone channel A. This can make Charlie’s detector D1
(D0) click with certainty, so that Charlie always receives
the same result as hers and therefore her cheating can
be covered. But if half-silvered mirrors or similar types
of beam splitters are used, when Eve sends a state to
Charlie through channel B alone, both of Charlie’s de-
tector D1 and D0 will have non-vanishing probabilities
to click so that Eve cannot control the result with cer-
tainty. Then the eavesdropping will not be successful,
just as shown in the security proof in [94].
VII. RELATIONSHIP WITH THE CBH
THEOREM
The above result is also useful for developing the un-
derstanding on fundamental theories. The CBH theorem
[96] is an attractive attempt to raise some information-
theoretic constraints to the level of fundamental laws of
Nature, from which quantum theory can be deduced.
These constraints were suggested to be three “no-go’s”,
which are (I) the impossibility of superluminal informa-
tion transfer, (II) the impossibility of perfectly broad-
casting of an unknown state, and (III) the impossibility of
unconditionally secure BC. It was worked out in [96] that
these three constraints can jointly entail three definitive
physical characteristics of quantum theory, i.e., kinematic
independence (a.k.a. microcausality), noncommutative,
and nonlocality. Meanwhile, to show that these three
characteristics and the above three information-theoretic
constraints are exactly equivalent, it is necessary to prove
conversely that the three characteristics can entail the
three constraints. This was only partly accomplished in
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[96]. It was demonstrated that the first two character-
istics can entail constraints (I) and (II). What was left
undone is the derivation of constraint (III). Note that
some people believe that the problem was solved later
by [47]. But in fact the no-go proof of QBC in [47] was
also based on the condition ρB0 ≃ ρB1 , which fails to cover
our protocol. Thus the derivation of constraint (III) is
still incomplete. In our understanding, this situation is
yet another evidence indicating that the MLC no-go the-
orem of unconditionally secure QBC is not a necessary
deduction of quantum mechanics. In fact, the reason
why the MLC theorem was included in the three con-
straints, simply put, is because it can entail nonlocality.
As can be seen from features (ii) and (iv) in our above
brief review of the MLC theorem, Alice can cheat in QBC
only when she has the capability to manipulate entangled
states. That is, the MLC theorem can be valid only if
the physical world allows entanglement, which is a typi-
cal example of nonlocality. However, our QBC protocol
also entail nonlocality. According to [101], Eq. (1) can
be rewritten using the standard notations of quantum
optics as
|Ψ0〉 = (|0〉 |1〉+ |1〉 |0〉)/
√
2,
|Ψ1〉 = (|0〉 |1〉 − |1〉 |0〉)/
√
2, (18)
where the first and second kets refer to the two quantum
communication channels, and the 0 and 1 inside the kets
refer to the photon number. This indicates that Alice’s
transmitted states in fact contain single-photon nonlocal-
ity. The resultant QBC can be executed only when Alice
has the capability to create such nonlocality. Otherwise,
if Alice merely sends both wave packets of a photon si-
multaneously into the quantum communication channels,
i.e., nonlocality is not fully utilized, then Bob can easily
intercept, clone, and resend all these orthogonal states
without being detected. That is, our result indicates that
QBC can be unconditionally secure only if there is non-
locality in the physical world. This somewhat clarifies
why most previous proposed QBC protocols (e.g., [3, 4])
are insecure. In these protocols, if Alice wants to commit
honestly, then sending Bob pure states unentangled with
any system at Alice’s side is already sufficient. Nonlocal-
ity is not entailed when these protocols are supposed to
be executed honestly. Thus, it is not surprising that a
dishonest party who is capable of manipulating entangled
states can gain more advantages than what is allowed in
these protocols. On the contrary, in our protocol an Alice
who only sends unentangled pure states will no longer be
considered as honest. Nonlocality becomes a must. Thus,
we can see that no matter the MLC theorem is correct
or our QBC protocol could indeed be unconditionally se-
cure, nonlocality is entailed in both cases. Therefore, we
tends to believe that the (im)possibility of uncondition-
ally secure QBC is irrelevant to the goal of characterizing
quantum theory in terms of information-theoretic con-
straints. To complete the CBH theorem, we may need
to seek for another information-theoretic principle as the
third constraint.
VIII. SUMMARY
We show that if a formerly proposed QKD scheme
based on orthogonal states [94] is secure, it can be used
to build a QBC protocol which remains concealing while
the reduced density matrix ρBb of the state Bob received
satisfies ρB0 ⊥ ρB1 . Thus it evades the MLC no-go theo-
rem [5–8], [31]-[52] which is valid for the case ρB0 ≃ ρB1
only. The resultant QBC protocol is not a bit commit-
ment with a certificate of classicality; thus, it cannot
lead to unconditionally secure quantum oblivious trans-
fer in the traditional way. But it can lead to quantum
bit string commitment and quantum strong coin tossing.
This finding suggests that a different principle other than
the MLC no-go theorem is needed for the CBH theorem
to completely characterize quantum theory in terms of
information-theoretic constraints.
The work was supported in part by the NSF of China
under grant No. 10975198, the NSF of Guangdong
province under grant No. 9151027501000043, and the
Foundation of Zhongshan University Advanced Research
Center.
Appendix A: Defeating the counterfactual attack
Though our protocol is unconditionally secure in prin-
ciple, as we mentioned at the end of Sec. III, under prac-
tical settings minor modifications may be needed against
technical attacks.
Recently a cheating strategy against counterfactual
QKD protocols [118, 119] was proposed [120]. Unlike
general intercept-resend attacks in which measurements
are performed on the quantum states carrying the se-
cret information, in this strategy the cheater makes use
of quantum counterfactual effect to detect the working
modes of the devices of other participants. Thus it was
named “the counterfactual attack” [120]. Here we will
skip how it applies to QKD protocols, while focus only
on its impact on our QBC protocol.
FIG. 3 illustrates the apparatus for the attack [120].
The core is a “fictitious” beam splitter (FBS) which has
the following functions.
(f1) Any photon hitting the FBS from path c will be
reflected with certainty.
(f2) When the paths a and b are adjusted correctly, two
wave packets coming from paths a and b respectively will
interfere and combine together, and enter path c with
certainty.
(f3) Any photon hitting the FBS from path a will pass
through the FBS and enter path d with certainty.
An ideal FBS that can realize these functions faithfully
does not exist in principle. Thus it is called “fictitious”.
For example, devices with the functions (f2) and (f3) may
not accomplish the function (f1) perfectly, i.e., a photon
coming from path c could pass the devices with a non-
trivial probability, making the attack detectable. How-
ever, FBS can be implemented approximately by using
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FIG. 3: Diagram of the apparatus for Alice’s counterfactual attack. A single-photon pulse produced by the source S passes
through the optical circulator C1 and hits the “fictitious” beam splitter (FBS) along path c. Path a is adjusted by the optical
delay OD, followed by a Faraday mirror FM . Any photon coming from path c from the right to the left will be detected by the
detector Dc, while the detector Dd detects any photon coming from path d. Path b is connected to both the input and output
of Bob’s channel A at time tj (or both the input and output of Bob’s channel B at time tj + τ ) via the optical circulator C2.
an infinite number of ordinary BS [119, 120]. In practice,
the number of BS involved in the implementation has to
be finite. But if the deviation from an ideal FBS is too
small to be detected within the capability of available
technology, then the attack could become a real threat.
Suppose that an ideal FBS is available to a dishonest
Alice in our QBC protocol. At each time instant tj (or
tj + τ) in step (4), she runs both the FBS system in
FIG. 3 and the apparatus in the honest protocol (i.e.,
the one shown in FIG. 2) simultaneously in parallel, with
path b of the FBS system connecting to both the input
and output of Bob’s channel A (or both the input and
output of Bob’s channel B). The apparatus in FIG. 2
works as usual so that the protocol can be executed as
if she is honest, while the FBS system serves as a probe
to detect Bob’s mode. According to the function (f2)
of the FBS, whenever Bob applies the bypass mode in
step (5), the wave packets of a photon Alice sent to the
FBS will be returned from both paths a and b so that
the detector Dc will click with certainty. On the other
hand, whenever Bob applies the intercept mode, an ideal
FBS can guarantee that Dc will never click as path b is
actually blocked. Therefore Alice can learn Bob’s mode
unambiguously. Since Bob does not know the state |Ψci〉
Alice sends when he applies the bypass mode, Alice can
lie about the value of the corresponding ci freely, thus
alters her committed b in the unveil phase.
Nevertheless, it is easy to defeat this counterfactual
attack. As pointed out in Ref. [120], Bob’s randomizing
the optical length of path b is sufficient to destroy the
interference effect in the FBS system. Therefore in our
protocol, Bob can simply add phase shifters (other than
the one shown in FIG. 2) to both channels A and B when
he applies the bypass mode, to introduce the same phase
shift in both channels so that an honest Alice will not
be affected. Meanwhile, the amount of this phase shift
is randomly chosen and kept secret from Alice, thus she
cannot know how to adjust path a to ensure Dc clicking
with certainty. Consequently, there will be times that
Alice does not know which mode Bob is running. Then
the number of ci’s that she can alter will be limited, which
is insufficient to change the committed b as long as the
value of d/n in our QBC protocol is properly chosen.
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